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Abstract The class of preferences over opportunity sets (“menus”) rationalizable by
underlying preferences over the alternatives is characterized for the general case in
which the dataset is unrestricted. In particular, both the universal set of alternatives and
the domain of menus over which preferences are asserted by the decision maker are
arbitrary. The key “Cover Dominance” axiom states that any menu strictly preferred
to a collection of menus must be strictly preferred to any menu covered by the collec-
tion. The method of characterization relies upon transitivity of menu preferences, but
completeness can be relaxed.
Keywords General domains · Opportunity sets · Revealed preference · Transitivity
JEL Classification D01 · D11
1 Introduction
1.1 The rationalizability question
This paper studies the question of when observed preferences over opportunity sets
(“menus”) can be rationalized by underlying preferences over the alternatives they
contain (“meals”). In the simplest environment, with finitely many options and a weak
preference asserted by the decisionmaker between each pair of subsets of the universal
menu, conditions for rationalizability were given by Kreps (1979, pp. 565–566) as a
benchmark for his axiomatization of “preference for flexibility.” Yet despite a large
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subsequent literature that incorporates into menu preferences various other tastes and
influences on behavior, the rationalizability question remains unanswered in the gen-
eral case.1
We shall generalize the environment in Kreps (1979) along both dimensions men-
tioned in the previous paragraph. Firstly, any nonempty universal set of alternatives
will be permitted, whether finite or (countably or uncountably) infinite. This will allow
our framework to accommodate the many economic contexts in which finiteness is
not a natural assumption, such as choice among consumption bundles, production
plans, lotteries, and asset allocations.2 Secondly, the domain of menus over which
preferences are asserted will be permitted to be any nonempty subset of the set of
conceivable choice problems. This will make our findings applicable to arbitrary
datasets, including those that arise from observational data or laboratory experiments;
or from structured settings where all menus are, for example, budget or production
sets.
At the heart of the rationalizability question is the need to translatemeal preferences
into menu preferences and vice versa. On the one hand, any meal-preference relation
induces a menu-preference relation via a simple rule (see Definition 1): One menu
is weakly preferred to another if each meal on the second menu is weakly inferior
to some meal on the first menu. This relationship—which formalizes the concept of
a rationalization—expresses the intuition that a menu is as good as the best meal it
contains.
Moving in the opposite direction is trivial in full-domain environments, where meal
preferences coincide with the observed preferences over singleton menus. But in our
general framework, singleton menus need not be included in the domain, and there-
fore a more reliable notion of revealed meal preference is required. We propose the
following conception (see Definition 3), which in a sense reverses the rule in the
previous paragraph: One meal is weakly preferred to another if each menu contain-
ing the first meal is weakly superior to some menu containing the second meal. This
revealed relation captures the intuition that a meal is as bad as the worst menu con-
taining it, and will be used to replicate the observed menu preferences in proving our
results.
1 Barbera et al. (2004) survey the menu-preference literature, while models of temptation, in particular,
are surveyed by Lipman and Pesendorfer (2013). Among the numerous more recent papers are those of
Ahn and Sarver (2013), Dekel et al. (2009), Epstein et al. (2007), Olszewski (2007), and Stovall (2010). As
mentioned by Dekel et al. (2009, p. 938), “[a] menu can be interpreted either literally or as an action which
affects subsequent opportunities.”
2 Note that we deliberately avoid “modeling the set of alternatives as lotteries and utilizing the resulting
linear structure by imposing the von Neumann–Morgenstern axioms” (Gul and Pesendorfer 2001, p. 1406);
a practice pioneered by Dekel et al. (2001) and Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) and adopted in much of the
ensuing menu-preference literature. (Some exceptions include Ergin 2003, Gul and Pesendorfer 2005, and
Nehring 1999).While it has the advantage of facilitating precise identification ofmodel components, such as
the subjective state space in Dekel et al. (2001), the lottery formulation can be viewed as a purely technical
device to the extent that objective risk is not essential to the phenomenon of interest (e.g., temptation).
Moreover, this formulation requires more of the decision maker, who must rank menus of lotteries over
outcomes rather than simply menus of outcomes.
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Fig. 1 The Cover Dominance axiom. The menus A, B1, B2, D ⊂ X are in the domain of the menu-
preference relation , with D ⊂ B1 ∪ B2. If A  B1 and A  B2, then Cover Dominance requires that
A  D
1.2 Axioms for rationalizability
In the finite, full-domain environment, Kreps (1979) characterizes the class of menu
preferences rationalizable by complete and transitive meal preferences. The first of
his two axioms, which we label Menu Order, states simply that the observed menu
preferences are themselves complete and transitive. This is a straightforward con-
sequence of the ordering properties imposed on the rationalizing meal-preference
relation, and the argument does not depend on finiteness or the full-domain assump-
tion (see Corollary 1). Hence, we inherit Menu Order from Kreps as a necessary
condition.
The second axiom used by Kreps (1979, p. 566), which we label Kreps Consis-
tency, states that the more preferred of any two menus is indifferent to their union.
This condition is clearly unsuitable for our framework, in which the domain of the
menu-preference relation need not be closed under union. We therefore replace Kreps
Consistency with a new and somewhat stronger axiom, Cover Dominance, which is
appropriate for the general case.3
Tounderstand the content ofCoverDominance, consider the situation inFig. 1.Here
 is the weak menu-preference relation (with associated strict relation and indiffer-
ence relation∼), X is the universal set of alternatives, and themenus A, B1, B2, D ⊂ X
are in the domain of . If both A  B1 and A  B2 and if  is rationalizable by
meal preferences, then each meal in B1 ∪ B2 should be strictly inferior to a meal in
A. If also D ⊂ B1 ∪ B2, then each meal in D (the “covered” menu) should likewise
3 To be precise, Cover Dominance is logically stronger than Kreps Consistency in the presence of Menu
Order (see Fig. 3).
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be strictly inferior to a meal in A. This leads us to anticipate that A  D, which is the
conclusion mandated by Cover Dominance.4
Our main result (Theorem 1) thus characterizes rationalizability by means of the
Menu Order and Cover Dominance conditions. In proving sufficiency of this axiom
system, we also establish two of its implications that are of interest in their own right.
One condition, Implicit Optima, states that each menu contains an alternative whose
presence on any other menu guarantees that the second menu is no worse than the
first. In terms of the rationalization, this means that even on infinite menus there can
be found a greatest option with respect to the meal-preference relation. The second
implied condition, Weak Cover Dominance, replaces strict with weak preference in
both the hypotheses and the conclusion of Cover Dominance. This alternate version
of the cover dominance property plays a role in the proof of sufficiency, as well as in
linking our axiom system to that of Kreps (1979).
1.3 Preferences over budget sets: an example
For a concrete illustration of our framework and characterization result, let X = 2+
and imagine a consumer with endowment 〈1, 1〉 who may face a variety of different
relative prices. Imagine further that the consumer asserts preferences over the four
price vectors 〈1, 1〉, 〈1, 2〉, 〈2, 1〉, and 〈1, 4〉; with respective budget sets B1, B1/2, B2,
and B1/4. This situation is depicted in Fig. 2, where the points x1, x2, . . . , x7 represent
arbitrary consumption bundles in different regions of X .
Suppose first that B1/2  B2  B1  B1/4. Since B1/2 ⊂ B1 ∪ B1/4 and both
B2  B1 and B2  B1/4, Cover Dominance requires that B2  B1/2. But this
contradicts the observed preference B1/2  B2, so Cover Dominance fails in this
case and we can conclude that  is not rationalizable by complete and transitive meal
preferences.
Now, suppose instead that B1/4  B2  B1  B1/2. Since B1 ⊂ B2∪B1/2 and both
B1/4  B2 and B1/4  B1/2, Cover Dominance implies B1/4  B1. This agrees with
the observed preferences, and it is straightforward to verify that no other violations of
Cover Dominance can be found in the dataset. Of course Menu Order also holds, and
thus  can be rationalized in this case.
Note that, according to the preferences in the previous paragraph, each of themenus
containing x5 (namely, B1 and B2) is strictly superior to some menu containing x4
(namely, B1/2). Evaluating each meal by the worst menu containing it, our revealed
preference relation therefore considers x5 strictly superior to x4. Similarly, our relation
considers x7 strictly superior to x5; x6 strictly superior to x7; and x1, x2, x3, and x4
indifferent to each other since they are all members of the lowest ranked menu (B1/2).
The meal preferences that rationalize a given menu-preference relation will not
in general be unique.5 Indeed, writing a generic consumption bundle in the present
4 Observe that menu A is never compared directly to B1 ∪ B2, which need not be in the domain of .
Moreover, note that Cover Dominance allows arbitrary (not only binary) unions of covering menus.
5 This is a natural consequence of our objective of characterizing rationalizability over arbitrary domains,
as evidenced by the similar non-uniqueness seen in Richter (1966), Bossert et al. (2006), Tyson (2013), and
other contributions that share this goal.
123
Rationalizability of menu preferences
1 2 3
1
2
B2
B1/4
B1/2B1
x1
x2
x3
x4
x5
x6
x7
Fig. 2 An example of preferences over the budget sets B1, B1/2, B2, and B1/4. The order B1/2  B2 
B1  B1/4 violates Cover Dominance and thus is not rationalizable. In contrast, the order B1/4  B2 
B1  B1/2 satisfies Cover Dominance and thus is rationalizable
context as z = 〈z1, z2〉, the preferences B1/4  B2  B1  B1/2 can be rationalized by
the two distinct meal-preference relations represented by the utility functions u(z) =
19z1+30z2 and v(z) = max{10z1z32, z41z2}. Neither coincides with our revealedmeal-
preference relation, which in this case has just four indifference classes (corresponding
to the four menus in the dataset). Concretely, the alternatives x˜1 = 〈0.2, 1.0〉 and
x˜4 = 〈2.0, 0.1〉 are ranked as indifferent by our revealed relation, while the two utility
functions yield opposing strict preferences computed as u(x˜1) = 33.8 < 41.0 =
u(x˜4) and v(x˜1) = 2.0 > 1.6 = v(x˜4). This example makes clear that deducing the
decision maker’s true meal preferences from arbitrary menu-preference data will not
typically be possible; and doing so is not our purpose in this paper. We wish, rather,
to find concise and transparent conditions that characterize rationalizability without
the help of domain assumptions and thus allow us to test this hypothesis under more
realistic circumstances.
1.4 Road map
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes how menu
preferences are induced by meal preferences and how meal preferences are revealed
by menu preferences, and introduces the Menu Order axiom. Section 3 proceeds to
develop the Cover Dominance axiom and to state and outline the proof of our main
result. Section 4 discusses rationalizability by incomplete meal preferences, shows
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how Kreps’s original characterization can be derived as a corollary of our result, and
demonstrates how the theory of rationalizable menu preferences parallels the theory
of rationalizable choice functions. Proofs are in the “Appendix”.
2 Meal and menu preferences
2.1 Preliminaries
Let X be a nonempty set of alternatives (also called “options” or “meals”), write X
for the power set of X , and fix both a nonempty domain D ⊂ X\{∅} of menus and a
relation  on D. Our primitives are thus 〈X,D,〉. Write Dx = {A ∈ D : x ∈ A}
for the set of menus that contain option x .
Given a relation R on X , write G(A,R) = {x ∈ A : ∀y ∈ A xRy} for the set of
R-greatest alternatives on menu A. A relation is a preorder if it is both reflexive and
transitive. For brevity, a complete preorder will be referred to simply as an order.6
As usual, we write A ∼ B when A  B  A and A  B when A  B  A.
Likewise, we write xIy when xRyRx and xPy when both xRy and ¬yRx .
2.2 Induced menu preferences
Kreps (1979, p. 565) uses preferences over alternatives to define preferences over
menus “in the obvious fashion.”
Definition 1 Given a relation R on X , define a relation R on D as follows: For each
A, B ∈ D, let A R B if and only if ∀y ∈ B, there exists an x ∈ A such that xRy.
In words, the induced relation R weakly prefers menu A to B if each option on B
is weakly inferior, according to the meal-preference relation R, to some option on A.
This is consistent with the standard model of choice, in which the decision maker will
eventually select from each menu a preference-maximal option according to which
the menu itself may be valued.
We write A ∼R B when A R B R A and A R B when A R B R A. For
complete R, Definition 1 can then be expressed as B R A if and only if ∃y ∈ B such
that ∀x ∈ A we have yPx . That is, a strict menu preference for B over A is induced
by R if some option on B is strictly better than every option on A.
An important consequence of Definition 1 is that the induced relation R inherits
a number of ordering properties from R.
Proposition 1 A. If R is reflexive, then R is reflexive. B. If R is complete, then R
is complete. C. If R is transitive, then R is transitive.
Finally, we can use induced menu preferences to formalize our concept of rational-
izability.
6 Recall that a binary relation R on X is reflexive if ∀x ∈ X we have xRx ; transitive if ∀x, y, z ∈ X we
have xRyRz ⇒ xRz; and complete if ∀x, y ∈ X we have ¬xRy ⇒ yRx .
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Definition 2 A rationalization of  is a relation R on X such that =R.
If the unobserved meal-preference relation is complete and transitive, then it follows
from Proposition 1 that the induced menu-preference relation exhibits the same prop-
erties. This yields a necessary condition for rationalizability by an order in the general
case.
Condition 1 (Menu Order) The relation  is an order.
Corollary 1 If  is rationalized by an order, then Menu Order holds.
Example 1 Let X = wxyz and D = {z, wx, wz, xy, xz, yz, xyz}. Then, the order
wPxIyPz on meals induces the order wx ∼R wz R xy ∼R xz ∼R yz ∼R xyz R z
onmenus. For instance,wehave thatwz R xy sincewRx andwRy, while xy   Rwz
since ¬xRw and ¬yRw.7
2.3 Revealed meal preferences
In order to achieve the desired characterization, wewill also need to be able to translate
the decision maker’s tastes from the menu-preference relation  to a revealed meal-
preference relation. This is accomplished by the following construction.
Definition 3 Define a relation Rˆ on X as follows: For each x, y ∈ X , let xRˆy if and
only if ∀A ∈ Dx , there exists a B ∈ Dy such that A  B.
Here, the revealed relation Rˆ weakly prefers option x to y if each menu containing x
is no worse, according to the primitive relation , than some menu containing y.
We write x Iˆy when xRˆyRˆx and x Pˆy when both xRˆy and ¬yRˆx . For complete ,
Definition 3 can then be expressed as yPˆx if and only if ∃A ∈ Dx such that ∀B ∈ Dy
we have B  A. That is, a strict meal preference for y over x is revealed by  if some
menu containing x is strictly worse than every menu containing y.
The latter paraphrasing of Definition 3 conveys the rationale behind the revealed
meal-preference relation Rˆ: If even the worst menu B containing y is strictly preferred
to somemenu A containing x , this suggests that y itself is strictly better than everything
in A and in particular strictly better than x . The expression xRˆy records the absence
of this situation, where the evidence from  indicates instead that x is at least as good
as y.
Our next result is the meal-preference analog of Proposition 1, establishing that Rˆ
inherits the same ordering properties from .
Proposition 2 A. If  is reflexive, then Rˆ is reflexive. B. If  is complete, then Rˆ is
complete. C. If  is transitive, then Rˆ is transitive.
Corollary 2 Menu Order implies that Rˆ is an order.
7 Note in this example the multiplicative notation for enumerated sets, which we use when convenient.
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Example 2 For the domain defined in Example 1, we have Dw = {wx, wz},Dx =
{wx, xy, xz, xyz},Dy = {xy, yz, xyz}, and Dz = {z, wz, xz, yz, xyz}. In this case,
the order wx ∼ wz  xy ∼ xz ∼ yz ∼ xyz  z on menus (identical to the induced
preferences in Example 1) reveals the original order wPˆx IˆyPˆz on meals. For instance,
we have that wRˆx since wx  xy and wz  xy, while ¬xRˆw since xy  wx and
xy  wz.
3 Main result
3.1 Characterization of rationalizability
We know from Corollary 2 that Menu Order is sufficient for Rˆ to be complete and
transitive. Hence, what is needed is a further condition that together with Menu Order
will guarantee that this relation rationalizes the observed .
To construct the required axiom,we shall use the concept of a covering set ofmenus.
Definition 4 The set B ⊂ D is said to cover A ∈ D if A ⊂ ⋃B := ⋃B∈B B.
Our condition then states that any menu strictly preferred to the elements of a cover
must be strictly preferred to the target of the cover.
Condition 2 (Cover Dominance) Let A, D ∈ D and let B ⊂ D cover D. If for each
B ∈ B we have A  B, then A  D.
Here, the intuition is that B collectively should be no worse than D, so Cover Domi-
nance has the flavor of a transitivity condition. Note, however, that
⋃
B may or may
not be in D, so we cannot argue simply that A  ⋃B  D and hence A  D.
To show necessity of our new axiom, we shall need the set of R-greatest elements
of each menu to be nonempty. Implicitly, this is of course the set of eventual choices
from the menu, and hence the additional structure required amounts to an assumption
of nonempty-valued choice.
Proposition 3 If  is rationalized by an order R with G(·,R) nonempty, then Cover
Dominance holds.
Our main result combines the assumptions on meal preference and the conditions
on menu preference across Corollary 1 and Proposition 3.
Theorem 1 The relation  is rationalized by an order R with G(·,R) nonempty if
and only if Menu Order and Cover Dominance hold.
Example 3 Themenu preferences in Example 2 are rationalized by an order and hence
satisfy both Menu Order and Cover Dominance. For instance, we have xz ⊂ xyz =
xy ∪ yz, wz  xy, and wz  yz, so Cover Dominance requires that wz  xz (which
is in fact the case). In contrast, the preferenceswx ∼ wz ∼ xz  xy ∼ yz ∼ xyz  z
fail Cover Dominance and so cannot be rationalized by an order.8
8 To see this, note that for any order rationalization R we have that wx  xy ⇒ wPx and wz  z ⇒
wPz. But this would imply that wx  xz (which is in fact not the case).
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3.2 Sufficiency of axioms
To achieve our characterization, it remains to show that the axioms in Theorem 1
are sufficient for Rˆ to rationalize  and generate a nonempty G(·, Rˆ). The former
property means both that all observed preferences are faithfully reproduced by Rˆ,
written ⊂Rˆ; and that all preferences induced by Rˆ are genuine, written Rˆ⊂.9
We shall verify the required properties of Rˆ with the help of two auxiliary conditions
implied by our axiom system. The first asserts the existence within each menu of
an “implicit optimum” whose appearance on any other menu ensures weak menu-
superiority.10
Condition 3 (Implicit Optima) For each A ∈ D, there exists an x ∈ A such that
∀B ∈ Dx we have B  A.
Proposition 4 A. If  is complete, then Cover Dominance implies Implicit Optima.
B. Menu Order and Implicit Optima imply Cover Dominance.
This condition yields the desired nonemptiness property of Rˆ.
Proposition 5 Implicit Optima implies that G(·, Rˆ) is nonempty.
Conveniently, it can also be used to prove the faithful-reproduction property.
Proposition 6 If  is transitive, then Implicit Optima implies that ⊂Rˆ.
Example 4 Recall themenu-preference order defined inExample 3, forwhichCover
Dominance fails. Here, alternativew is an implicit optimum for the menuswx andwz,
alternative x for the menus xy and xyz, alternative y for the menu yz, and alternative
z for the menu z. The menu xz contains no implicit optimum, since x ∈ xy ≺ xz and
z ∈ yz ≺ xz.
Our second auxiliary condition is a weak-preference counterpart of Cover Domi-
nance and has a similar intuition in terms of the cover B supplying a bridge between
menu A and the (now weakly) inferior menu D.
Condition 4 (Weak Cover Dominance) Let A, D ∈ D and let B ⊂ D cover D. If for
each B ∈ B we have A  B, then A  D.
Proposition 7 If is transitive, then ImplicitOptima impliesWeakCoverDominance.
9 This is different from the statement that Rˆ coincides with the decision maker’s true but unobserved
meal-preference relation R. Even when Rˆ==R and we have successfully replicated the agent’s menu
preferences, we cannot be certain that either R ⊂ Rˆ or Rˆ ⊂ R. Indeed, the failure of these inclusions in
general is made clear by the example of preferences over budget sets in Sect. 1.3.
10 This condition strengthens the Desire for Commitment axiom used by Dekel et al. (2009, p. 946) to
study “temptation-driven preferences.” In the full-domain environment, Desire for Commitment requires
that for each A ∈ D there exists an x ∈ A such that {x}  A. Here, alternative x can be interpreted as an
implicit optimum for menu A, but since Dekel et al. allow for temptation they do not require B  A for
menus B ∈ Dx other than the singleton {x}.
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This condition can be used to prove the genuineness property of Rˆ.
Proposition 8 Weak Cover Dominance implies that Rˆ⊂.
Note that Weak Cover Dominance is not in general strong enough to yield Implicit
Optima, even in the presence of Menu Order. To support this claim, we offer the
following example.
Example 5 Let X = x1y1x2y2x3y3 . . . , A = x1x2x3 . . . , Bk = xk yk for k ≥ 1, and
D = {A, B1, B2, B3, . . .}. Moreover, let B1 ≺ B2 ≺ B3 ≺ . . ., and let A  Bk for
k ≥ 1.While these preferences satisfy bothMenu Order andWeak Cover Dominance,
they fail Implicit Optima. Indeed, the menu A contains no implicit optimum since
xk ∈ Bk ≺ A for k ≥ 1. Note that, in view of Proposition 4A,  must fail Cover
Dominance as well. This can be verified by observing that A ⊂ ⋃∞k=1 Bk and A  Bk
for k ≥ 1, while the conclusion A  A is obviously false.
To show that Rˆ rationalizes , we need the full strength of Implicit Optima and
not just Weak Cover Dominance (see Propositions 6–8). Under Menu Order, we know
that Implicit Optima and Cover Dominance are equivalent (see Proposition 4), but to
ensure these conditions hold rationalizability alone is insufficient—nonemptiness is
also needed (see Proposition 3). Fortunately, nonemptiness of G(·, Rˆ) is guaranteed
by Implicit Optima (see Proposition 5), making possible the construction of a two-way
result in Theorem 1.11
4 Additional results and discussion
4.1 Incomplete preferences
Theorem 1 can be adapted relatively easily to accommodate incompleteness of the
primitive relation  and the rationalizing relation R. Propositions 1–2 show that the
properties of a preorder (namely, reflexivity and transitivity) transfer betweenmeal and
menu preferences independently of completeness, and hence the following condition
is a suitable adaptation.
Condition 5 (Menu Preorder) The relation  is a preorder.
Corollary 3 A. If is rationalized by a preorder, thenMenu Preorder holds.B.Menu
Preorder implies that Rˆ is a preorder.
As for Cover Dominance, scrutiny of the proof of Theorem 1 reveals that a slightly
different version of the axiom yields a valid characterization with or without the
completeness assumption.12
11 Example 5 illustrates why Theorem 1 imposes the nonemptiness condition. At a somewhat deeper level,
this condition is needed because our theory of rationalizable menu preferences parallels the theory of
rationalizable choice functions (see Sect. 4.3). In the latter context, nonemptiness of each set of maximal
alternatives is typically imposed as a background assumption, whereas we state the property explicitly.
12 On the other hand, there is little prospect of relaxing transitivity, which is used heavily in the proof
of Theorem 1. For instance, transitivity is employed to establish the necessity of Cover Dominance (in
Proposition 3) and to show the faithful-reproduction property of Rˆ (in Proposition 6).
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Condition 6 (Negative Cover Dominance) Let A, D ∈ D and let B ⊂ D cover D. If
for each B ∈ B we have B  A, then D  A.
When  is complete, we have both B  A ⇐⇒ [A  B ∧ B  A] ⇐⇒ A  B
and D  A ⇐⇒ [A  D ∧ D  A] ⇐⇒ A  D; and so the two versions of the
condition are logically equivalent. In this case, we favor Cover Dominance since it
is the more transparent and readily interpretable form of the axiom, but adapting our
result to the incomplete case calls for the alternative form.
Theorem 2 The relation  is rationalized by a preorder R with G(·,R) nonempty if
and only if Menu Preorder and Negative Cover Dominance hold.
The proof of this result requires only minor changes to that of Theorem 1 and is
therefore left to the reader.
4.2 Domain restrictions
Our main result characterizes rationalizability of menu preferences using the Menu
Order and Cover Dominance axioms. To establish sufficiency, we have shown that
in the presence of Menu Order, Cover Dominance is equivalent to Implicit Optima,
which in turn implies Weak Cover Dominance. But Weak Cover Dominance is not
in general strong enough to yield Implicit Optima, even with Menu Order. For this
to be the case, we need to assume that the domain D is finite, as established by the
following proposition.
Proposition 9 Let D be finite. Then, Menu Order and Weak Cover Dominance imply
Implicit Optima.
Assume now that the domain D is both finite and closed under union.13 This takes
us into a setting where rationalizability is captured by the axiom originally proposed
by Kreps (1979, p. 565).
Condition 7 (Kreps Consistency) Let A, B ∈ D be such that A ∪ B ∈ D. If A  B,
then A ∼ A ∪ B.
Proposition 10 If  is reflexive, then Weak Cover Dominance implies Kreps Consis-
tency.
A straightforward implication of Kreps’s condition is monotonicity with respect to set
inclusion (called “desire for flexibility” in Kreps 1979).
Condition 8 (Monotonicity) Let A, B ∈ D. If A ⊂ B, then B  A.
Proposition 11 If  is complete, then Kreps Consistency implies Monotonicity.
13 A referee points out that when D is finite, the assumption that it is closed under union is substantially
less restrictive. This is because a rationalization R of menu preferences over any finite D can be extended
to the closure of D under union, and moreover, nonemptiness of G(·,R) will survive this extension. The
same is not true for infinite D (cf. Example 5).
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Cover
Dominance
Prop. 4A
complete
Prop. 4B
order
Implicit
Optima
Prop. 7
transitive
Prop. 9
order
D finite
Weak Cover
Dominance
Prop. 10
reflexive
Prop. 12
order
D finite, -closed
Kreps
Consistency
Fig. 3 Logical relationships between selected axioms. Each implication is labeled with the relevant result
(e.g., “Prop. 9 ”), the required assumptions on menu preferences (e.g., “ [is an] order”), and any necessary
restrictions on the domain (e.g., “D [is] finite”)
The latter fact is useful in proving the following converse to Proposition 10.
Proposition 12 Let D be finite and closed under union. Then, Menu Order and Kreps
Consistency imply Weak Cover Dominance.
We can then state a version of our result that has Kreps’s full-domain characterization
as an immediate corollary.14
Theorem 3 Let D be finite and closed under union. Then,  is rationalized by an
order R with G(·,R) nonempty if and only if Menu Order and Kreps Consistency
hold.
Corollary 4 (Kreps 1979) Let X be finite and D = X\{∅}. Then,  is rationalized
by an order if and only if Menu Order and Kreps Consistency hold.
Selected axioms and implications are summarized in Fig. 3. When the domain is
both finite and closed under union, any of the four conditions shown suffices (together
with Menu Order) to characterize rationalizability. If the domain is not closed under
union, then Kreps Consistency no longer suffices, and if D is not finite then Weak
CoverDominance too is inadequate. For general domains, the desired axiomatization is
supplied by either Cover Dominance or Implicit Optima. The latter condition employs
an existential quantifier and so can be seen as less attractive in terms of falsifiability.
For this reason, we use Cover Dominance in the statement of Theorem 1.15
4.3 Analogy with rationalizability of choice functions
Several aspects of our investigation of rationalizable menu preferences have coun-
terparts in the theory of rationalizable choice functions. Here, we briefly outline the
14 Theorem 3 follows from Theorem 1 together with Propositions 4, 7, 9, 10, and 12.
15 For a penetrating analysis of the structure of axioms and falsifiability of the associated theories, see
Chambers et al. (2014).
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analogy between these two frameworks, assuming in the text for expository purposes
that the domain D is both finite and closed under union.
A choice function over D is a C : D → X\{∅} such that ∀A ∈ D we have
C(A) ⊂ A. The members ofC(A) are interpreted as the options chosen frommenu A.
A rationalization of C is a relation R on X such that C = G(·,R). Define the revealed
meal-preference relation R¯ by xR¯y if and only if ∃A ∈ Dy such that x ∈ C(A).
Recall that Weak Cover Dominance requires any menu weakly preferred to the ele-
ments of a cover to be weakly preferred to the target of the cover. The choice-theoretic
counterpart of this requirement is a condition referred to by Tyson (2013, p. 955) as
“extraction consistency”: Any alternative chosen from the elements of a cover must
be chosen (if available) from the target of the cover.16 Extraction consistency is nec-
essary and sufficient for C to admit a rationalization, just as Weak Cover Dominance
is necessary and sufficient for an order  to admit a rationalization. Indeed, extraction
consistency holds if and only if C = G(·, R¯), just as Weak Cover Dominance holds if
and only if =Rˆ.
Extraction consistency is equivalent to the conjunction of two conditions: The first,
“contraction consistency,” says that any meal chosen from a larger menu must be
chosen (if available) from a smaller menu, and is the analog of Monotonicity. The
second, “weak expansion consistency,” says that any meal chosen from each menu in
a collection must be chosen from the union of the collection, and is the analog of the
following menu-preference axiom.17
Condition 9 (Weak Union Dominance) Let A ∈ D and let B ⊂ D be such that⋃
B ∈ D. If for each B ∈ B we have A  B, then A  ⋃B.
We can now state a counterpart to the equivalence result for choice functions.
Proposition 13 If D is closed under union and  is a preorder, then Weak Cover
Dominance is equivalent to the conjunction of Monotonicity and Weak Union Domi-
nance.
With regard to rationalizability, there are two notable differences between themenu-
preference and choice-function frameworks. The first concerns the ordering properties
of the rationalizing relationR.Transitivity ofR is needed for ourmain result, in contrast
to the characterization of rationalizable choice functions via extraction consistency.
Moreover, in view of Propositions 1–2 we can ensure that R has the relevant ordering
properties simply by imposing these same properties on , without modifying Cover
Dominance. This differs from the choice-function setting, where extraction consis-
tency must be strengthened to guarantee the existence of an order rationalization.18
16 Formally, for each D ∈ D and for any cover B ⊂ D of D, we have [⋂B∈B C(B)] ∩ D ⊂ C(D). This
is equivalent to the “V-Axiom” in Richter (1971, p. 33), apparently the first statement of the condition.
17 Formally, contraction consistency requires that for each A, B ∈ D with A ⊂ B we have C(B) ∩
A ⊂ C(A), while weak expansion consistency requires that for each B ⊂ D with ⋃B ∈ D we have⋂
B∈B C(B) ⊂ C(
⋃
B). These conditions are, respectively, “Property α” in Sen (1969, p. 384) and
“Property γ ” in Sen (1971, p. 314).
18 The Congruence Axiom in Richter (1966, p. 637) is the classical condition achieving this goal.
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The second difference concerns the existence of an R-greatest alternative on each
menu. In the menu-preference setting, we deal with this issue directly, proving (in
Proposition 4A) that the Implicit Optima condition follows from our axiomatization
and including nonemptiness of G(·,R) in the statement of our results. Indeed, it is to
capture precisely this requirement that we use Cover Dominance in Theorem 1 rather
than Weak Cover Dominance (the more direct analog of extraction consistency). In
the choice-function setting, on the other hand, nonemptiness of G(·,R) is ensured
by nonemptiness of the primitive C together with the definition of a rationalization,
independently of any axioms imposed.
Despite these differences, the theories of rationalizability for menu preferences and
for choice functions have a considerable amount in commonwhen formulated to allow
arbitrary datasets, and this analogy may prove fruitful for future work in both areas.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 A. For all A ∈ D and ∀x ∈ A, we have xRx , since R is
reflexive, and hence A R A. Thus, R is reflexive. B. For all A, B ∈ D, we have
A R B ⇐⇒¬∀y ∈ B ∃x ∈ A xRy
⇐⇒∃y ∈ B ∀x ∈ A ¬xRy
⇒∃y ∈ B ∀x ∈ A yRx
⇒∀x ∈ A ∃y ∈ B yRx
⇐⇒B R A,
where the third implication uses the completeness of R. Thus, R is complete. C. For
all A, B, D ∈ D, we have
A R B R D ⇐⇒[∀y ∈ B ∃x ∈ A xRy] ∧ [∀z ∈ D ∃w ∈ B wRz]
⇒∀z ∈ D ∃w ∈ B ∃x ∈ A xRwRz
⇒∀z ∈ D ∃x ∈ A xRz
⇐⇒A R D,
where the second implication assigns y = w and the third uses the transitivity of R.
Thus, R is transitive. unionsq
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Proof of Proposition 2 A. For all x ∈ X and ∀A ∈ Dx , we have A  A, since  is
reflexive, and hence xRˆx . Thus, Rˆ is reflexive. B. For all x, y ∈ X , we have
¬xRˆy ⇐⇒¬∀A ∈ Dx ∃B ∈ Dy A  B
⇐⇒∃A ∈ Dx ∀B ∈ Dy ¬A  B
⇒∃A ∈ Dx ∀B ∈ Dy B  A
⇒∀B ∈ Dy ∃A ∈ Dx B  A
⇐⇒yRˆx,
where the third implication uses the completeness of . Thus, Rˆ is complete. C. For
all x, y, z ∈ X we have
xRˆyRˆz ⇐⇒[∀A ∈ Dx ∃B ∈ Dy A  B] ∧ [∀D ∈ Dy ∃E ∈ Dz D  E]
⇒∀A ∈ Dx ∃B ∈ Dy ∃E ∈ Dz A  B  E
⇒∀A ∈ Dx ∃E ∈ Dz A  E
⇐⇒xRˆz,
where the second implication assigns D = B and the third uses the transitivity of .
Thus, Rˆ is transitive. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 3 For all A, D ∈ D and B ⊂ D that covers D, we have
∀B ∈ B A  B ⇒∀B ∈ B B  A
⇐⇒∀B ∈ B B R A
⇐⇒∀B ∈ B ¬∀y ∈ A ∃x ∈ B xRy
⇐⇒∀B ∈ B ∃y ∈ A ∀x ∈ B ¬xRy
⇒∃z ∈ A ∀B ∈ B ∃y ∈ A ∀x ∈ B [zRy ∧ ¬xRy]
⇒∃z ∈ A ∀B ∈ B ∀x ∈ B ¬xRz
⇒∃z ∈ A ∀x ∈ D ¬xRz
⇐⇒¬∀z ∈ A ∃x ∈ D xRz
⇐⇒D R A
⇐⇒D  A
⇐⇒[A  D ∧ D  A]
⇐⇒A  D,
where the fifth implication follows from G(A,R) = ∅, the sixth from the transitivity
of R, the seventh from the fact thatB covers D, and the eleventh from the completeness
of R. Hence, Cover Dominance holds. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 4 A. Suppose that Implicit Optima fails, in which case ∃A ∈ D
such that ∀x ∈ A we can find a Bx ∈ Dx with Bx  A. Since  is complete, we have
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A  Bx and thus A  Bx . We have also A ⊂ ⋃x∈A Bx , and so Cover Dominance
implies that A  A, a contradiction. B. For all A, D ∈ D and B ⊂ D that covers D,
we have
∀B ∈ B A  B ⇒∃x ∈ D ∃Bx ∈ B ∩ Dx A  Bx  D
⇐⇒∃x ∈ D ∃Bx ∈ B ∩ Dx [A  Bx  D ∧ Bx  A]
⇒D  A
⇐⇒[A  D ∧ D  A]
⇐⇒A  D,
where the first implication follows from Implicit Optima, the third from the transitivity
of , and the fourth from the completeness of . Hence, Cover Dominance holds. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 5 We have that
∀A ∈ D ∃x ∈ A ∀B ∈ Dx B  A
⇒ ∀A ∈ D ∃x ∈ A ∀B ∈ Dx ∀y ∈ A ∃E ∈ Dy B  E
⇐⇒ ∀A ∈ D ∃x ∈ A ∀y ∈ A ∀B ∈ Dx ∃E ∈ Dy B  E
⇐⇒ ∀A ∈ D ∃x ∈ A ∀y ∈ A xRˆy
⇐⇒ ∀A ∈ D G(A, Rˆ) = ∅,
where the initial assertion is Implicit Optima. Hence, G(·, Rˆ) is nonempty. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 6 For all A, B ∈ D, we have
A  B ⇐⇒∃x ∈ A ∀D ∈ Dx D  A  B
⇒∃x ∈ A ∀D ∈ Dx D  B
⇐⇒∀y ∈ B ∃x ∈ A ∀D ∈ Dx D  B
⇒∀y ∈ B ∃x ∈ A xRˆy
⇐⇒A Rˆ B,
where the first implication follows from Implicit Optima and the second from the
transitivity of . Hence, we have ⊂Rˆ. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 7 For all A, D ∈ D and B ⊂ D that covers D, we have
∀B ∈ B A  B ⇒ ∃x ∈ D ∃Bx ∈ B ∩ Dx A  Bx  D ⇒ A  D,
where the first implication follows from Implicit Optima and the second from the
transitivity of . Hence, Weak Cover Dominance holds. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 8 For all A, B ∈ D, we have
A Rˆ B ⇐⇒∀y ∈ B ∃x ∈ A xRˆy
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⇐⇒∀y ∈ B ∃x ∈ A ∀D ∈ Dx ∃Ey ∈ Dy D  Ey
⇒∀y ∈ B ∃Ey ∈ Dy A  Ey
⇒A  B,
where the fourth implication follows from Weak Cover Dominance. Hence, we have
Rˆ⊂. unionsq
Proof of Theorem 1 If  is rationalized by an order R with G(·,R) nonempty, then
Menu Order holds by Corollary 1 and Cover Dominance holds by Proposition 3.
Conversely, if Menu Order and Cover Dominance hold, then Implicit Optima holds
by Proposition 4A, Weak Cover Dominance holds by Proposition 7, Rˆ rationalizes 
by Propositions 6 and 8 , Rˆ is an order by Corollary 2, and G(·, Rˆ) is nonempty by
Proposition 5. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 9 Suppose Implicit Optima fails, in which case ∃A ∈ D such
that ∀x ∈ A we can find a Bx ∈ Dx with Bx  A. Since D is finite, the set B = {Bx :
x ∈ A} ⊂ D is also finite. Moreover, since  is an order, ∃y ∈ A such that ∀x ∈ A
we have By  Bx . Observing that A ⊂ ⋃B, Weak Cover Dominance now implies
that By  A, contradicting By  A. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 10 Let A, B ∈ D be such that A ∪ B ∈ D and A  B. We have
A  A since  is reflexive and therefore A  A ∪ B by Weak Cover Dominance.
Moreover, we have A ∪ B  A ∪ B ⊃ A since  is reflexive, and it follows that
A ∪ B  A by Weak Cover Dominance. Thus, A ∼ A ∪ B, and Kreps Consistency
holds. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 11 Given A, B ∈ D with A ⊂ B, suppose that B  A. Then,
A  B since is complete and A∪B = B ∈ D since A ⊂ B, so that A ∼ A∪B = B
by Kreps Consistency. But this contradicts B  A. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 12 Given A, D ∈ D and B ⊂ D that covers D, suppose that
∀B ∈ B we have A  B. Since D is finite, B ⊂ D is finite and can be enumerated
as B = {B1, . . . , Bn}. For each k ≤ n, write Ek := ⋃ki=1 Bi and note that both
Ek ∈ D and A ∪ Ek ∈ D since D is closed under union. Since A  B1, we have
A ∼ A ∪ B1 = A ∪ E1 by Kreps Consistency. [Inductive step begins.] Suppose that
for some k < n we have A ∼ A ∪ Ek . Since A  Bk+1 and  is transitive, it follows
that A ∪ Ek  Bk+1. But then
A ∼ A ∪ Ek ∼ [A ∪ Ek] ∪ Bk+1 = A ∪ Ek+1,
using Kreps Consistency. [Inductive step ends.] By induction, we can conclude that
A ∼ A ∪ En . Since D ⊂ ⋃B = En ⊂ A ∪ En and  is complete, we have also
A ∪ En  D by Proposition 11, and so A  D since  is transitive. Hence, Weak
Cover Dominance holds. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 13 If Weak Cover Dominance holds, then Weak Union Domi-
nance is immediate. Moreover, ∀A, B ∈ D if A ⊂ B then since is reflexive we have
B  B and thus B  A by Weak Cover Dominance. Hence, Monotonicity holds.
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For the converse, supposeMonotonicity andWeak Union Dominance hold and take
any A, D ∈ D and B ⊂ D that covers D. Since D is closed under union, we have⋃
B ∈ D. If for each B ∈ B we have A  B, then A  ⋃B by Weak Union
Dominance, and since D ⊂ ⋃B we have ⋃B  D by Monotonicity. But then
A 
⋃
B  D, and so A  D since  is transitive. Hence, Weak Cover Dominance
holds. unionsq
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